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Notes
Strict Liability for Generators, Transporters, and
Disposers of Hazardous Wastes
I. INTRODUCTION
The Department of Justice and the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) consider the improper disposal of hazard-
ous wastes' generated by private industry to be the "most
serious environmental problem of the day."2 The incident at
the Love Canal area of Niagara Falls, New York, dramatically
demonstrates the serious threat that these wastes pose to a
broad range of people and interests. 3 In August 1978, President
Carter declared that area a national disaster after chemical
wastes buried thirty years earlier seeped out of a landfill and
1. Hazardous wastes are solid wastes that cause serious illness or death
in humans and that, when unmanaged, pose substantial present or potential
threats to the environment. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976,
42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1976) [hereinafter cited as RCRA]. Hazardous waste gener-
ation means the act or process of producing hazardous wastes. Id. at § 6903(6).
The Minnesota Law Review wishes to thank Peter Ehrhardt, a researcher
for the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, for his assistance in the prepara-
tion of this Note.
2. 10 ENvn. REP. (BNA) 1275 (1979) (quoting Department of Justice attor-
ney Barry Trilling at a meeting of the Federal Bar Association on September'
28, 1979). A House Subcommittee reached similar conclusions after 13 days of
hearings and nearly one year of study. House SuBcomm. ON OvEsIGrr AND IN-
VESTIGATIONS OF THE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 96TH
CONG., Ist SEss. HAZARDOUs WAsTE DISPOsAL I (Comm. Print 1979) [hereinaf-
ter cited as HAZARDOuS WASTE DISPOSAL].
3. Some victims of improper hazardous waste disposal are homeowners
who, because of the proximity of their property to hazardous waste disposal
sites or spill sites, suffer damage to their health and property. See note 4 infra.
See also Weingarten, A Tiny Town Cries Foul, Nat. IJ., Oct. 22, 1979, at 1, col 2
(description of effects of toxic chemical spill from freight train derailment near
Sturgeon, Missouri); 10 ENvrR. REP. (BNA) 1796-97 (1980); 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA)
1782 (1979); 9 ENvm. REP. (BNA) 662 (1978) (descriptions of clandestine dump-
ing of PCB-laced oil-waste chemicals along 211 miles of roads in North Caro-
lina). Other victims are workers who handle the wastes. See Rosenbaum,
Chemical Wastes Pose Real Danger, Minneapolis Tribune, Aug. 26, 1979, § D, at
1, coL 1 (description of the death of a 19-year-old truck driver from his inhaling
lethal fumes as he unloaded his cargo of "spent industrial caustics"). Also af-
fected are farmers who unknowingly purchase and use products contaminated
by hazardous wastes. See note 5 infra.
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caused major damage to property and human health.4 The haz-
ardous waste problem is not limited to isolated incidents like
that at Love Canal, however.5 The EPA has estimated that of
the forty-six million tons of hazardous wastes generated in the
United States in 1978, forty-one million tons were disposed of
improperly.6
Despite widespread publicity concerning the problem, gov-
4. Hooker Chemical and Plastics Corporation had buried drums of chemi-
cal wastes at the landfill site from 1947 to 1952, apparently complying with ex-
isting laws and using the standard technology of the time. 9 ENvm. REP. (BNA)
581 (1978). In 1953 Hooker sold the landfill site to the local school district; a
clause in the property deed released the company from any claims resulting
from the buried chemicals. Id. at 2293. In 1978 contaminated water leaking
from the landfill into surrounding homes and onto the ground surface created
serious health problems necessitating the evacuation and relocation of over 200
families. See, Hazardous and Toxic Waste Disposal Field Hearing (Part II):
Joint Hearings before the Subcomm. on Environmental Pollution and Resource
Protection of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 62-82 (1979) (testimony of Dr. Beverly Paigen); id. at 125-27 (testi-
mony of Luella Kenny). Over 200 chemicals have been identified at the site,
including carcinogens and mutagens. 3 CHEMICAL REG. REP. (BNA) 890-91
(1979).
Although Hooker has offered to pay $280,000 toward the estimated $22 mil-
lion clean-up cost, a company spokesman has declared that Hooker has "abso-
lutely no legal liability to pay or help out." Rosenbaum, supra note 3, at 6, col 4
(quoting Bruce Davis, Executive Vice-President of Hooker's Industrial Chemi-
cal Group). The federal government has sued Hooker Chemical for over $124
million to recover clean-up costs and to impose civil penalties. 10 ENVUR REP.
(BNA) 1743 (1979).
For a detailed description of the events that led to public awareness of the
seriousness of the problem and of the inept attempts of government officials to
solve the problem, see Brown, Love Canal and the Poisoning of America, AT-
LANric MONTHLY, Dec. 1979, at 33.
5. In many cases, the party responsible for the improper disposal either
cannot be identified or is insolvent. See 10 ENvm REP. (BNA) 1054 (1979) (1000
to 2000 gallons per minute of water contaminated with toxic materials poured
out of a mine shaft into the Susquehanna River in Pennsylvania because of Me-
gal clandestine dumping of wastes; state authorities could not immediately
identify the property owner, the generator of the wastes, or the transporters.); 3
CHEMICAL REG. REP. (BNA) 888-89 (1979) (Defunct electric utility sold off con-
taining high levels of PCBs to Kansas farmer who accidentally contaminated
168 cattle by using the oil, mixed with pesticides, to protect cattle from insects;
cattle were rendered and shipped for use in pet and poultry food before con-
tamination was discovered.); H.R. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, re-
printed in [19761 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6238, 6256 [hereinafter cited as
H.R. REP. No. 1491] (New Jersey bulldozer operator was killed in an explosion
at an industrial landfill as he was burying drums of unidentified chemical
wastes.). See also id. at 17-23, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 6255-61; HAzARDOUS WAsm DIsPosAT, supra note 2, at 3-5, 9-18 (more recent
list of such incidents and their consequences).
6. Goldfarb, The Hazards of Our Hazardous Waste Policy, 19 NAT. RE-
SOURcES J. 249, 251 (1979). The amount of hazardous wastes generated has in-
creased over the years. In 1975, the EPA estimated that 25 million tons of
hazardous wastes were generated, a 250% increase over the amount reported to
[Vol. 64:949
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ernmental response has been slow and inadequate. Ironically,
congressional attempts to regulate hazardous waste disposal
may have inadvertently contributed to the problem. Because
compliance with federal statutes results in a substantial in-
crease in the cost of disposal,7 generators, transporters, and
disposers are under additional economic pressure to dispose of
hazardous wastes in illegal, and often secretive, ways. In Octo-
ber 1979, a special section within the Justice Department was
established to prosecute illegal disposers of hazardous wastes.
Only ten attorneys, however,.are assigned to the section.8
The American legal system often fails to provide adequate
compensation to victims of improper hazardous waste disposal.
This Note first discusses the inadequacies of current remedies,
including remedies available under existing legislation and the
Congress in 1974. W. RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAw § 6.10, at
689 (1977).
The EPA estimates that there are 33,000 to 50,000 hazardous waste dump
sites in the United States. Of these sites, 1200 to 2000 may pose significant
problems, and 500 to 800 may have to be closed. President Carter, Second Envi-
ronmental Message to Congress and White House Staff Fact Sheet, ENvm. REP.
(BNA) (Federal Laws) 21:0162 (1979).
An additional problem is hazardous waste spills. Between October 1977
and September 1979, 3000 such spills were reported to the EPA. 10 ENvn. REP.
(BNA) 2012 (1980).
In Minnesota, 128,000 tons of potentially hazardous wastes are generated
each year, but state officials have no information concerning where 57% of the
identified hazardous waste is disposed. REPORT TO THE MINNESOTA POLLTION
CONTROL AGENCY: HAzARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT, 1-3, 1-7 (Aug. 1979) [here-
inafter cited as HAZARDoUS WASTE MANAGEMENT].
7. According to EPA estimates, the costs for merely upgrading waste dis-
posal to meet newly enacted federal statutes will average $1.65 per ton. 10 EN-
vIR. REP. (BNA) 1549 (1979). Estimates for the total cost of proper disposal of
hazardous wastes vary from $.10 to $1.00 per gallon, "depending on the type of
waste and the method of disposal." Rosenbaum, supra note 3, at 6, col. 1. Even
if companies *re willing to pay the high costs, they may have difficulty finding
an approved site. Are Waste Disposal Sites Just Some Dots on a Map?, CHEMI-
CAL WEEK, Nov. 1, 1978, at 67.
In Minnesota, estimates for the increased costs of meeting state and fed-
eral hazardous waste disposal requirements range from $80 a ton to $200 a ton.
HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT, supra note 6, at 11-82. In contrast, unregu-
lated on-site disposal has been estimated to cost $1.00 per ton. Id. at 111-41.
Other problems are presented when a state enacts strict disposal proce-
dures but neighboring states do not. New Jersey generators reacted to the ad-
ded costs imposed by strict regulations by shipping 70% of their wastes to
Pennsylvania, where disposal laws are much less stringent. HAzARDOUs WASTE
DISPOSAL, supra note 2, at 46, 72.
The combined effects of state and federal regulations may have interna-
tional implications, since at least a few corporations are considering shipping
their toxic wastes overseas in order to avoid permit requirements imposed by
recent statutes. Shabecoff, Firms May Dump Toxic Wastes Overseas, Minneap-
olis Tribune, Feb. 3, 1980, § D, at 3, col. 2.
8. 10 Eir. REP. (BNA) 1275 (1979).
1980]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
most often used common law theories of recovery for injuries
caused by other types of pollution. This Note then suggests
that strict liability is a viable theory on which victims of im-
proper hazardous waste disposal can base claims for compen-
sation against producers, transporters, and disposers of such
wastes.
II. STATUTES REGULATING HAZARDOUS WASTES:
AN OVERVIEW
A. FEDERAL STATUTES
Although approximately twenty federal statutes regulate
solid waste, only five of these have a significant impact on haz-
ardous waste disposal,9 and none expressly provide for com-
pensating hazardous waste victims. The five statutes merely
provide a private citizen with the right to sue for enforcement
of the statutory provisions and authorize compensation for
clean-up costs in a few limited cases.10
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976
(RCRA)'1 sets forth the primary federal regulatory scheme for
nonradioactive waste disposal.12 Its "cradle to grave" regula-
tory scheme includes a procedure for identifying hazardous
substances13 and subjecting the generators, transporters, and
9. W. RODGERS, supra note 6, § 6.10, at 691. Among other federal statutes,
not discussed but applicable to hazardous wastes, are the Insecticide, Fungi-
cide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C.A. § 135 (1964 & Supp. 1980); Federal Hazard-
ous Substances Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1261 (1974 & Supp. 1980); and
Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act, 7 U.S.C.A. § 136 (1964 & Supp.
1980).
10. See generally Costle, Introduction, 9 ST. MARY'S UJ. 661 (1978).
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976).
12. RCRA revised the Solid Waste Disposal Act (Title II), Pub. L. No. 89-
272, § 201, 79 Stat. 997 (1965) and expanded the Resource Recovery Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-512, 84 Stat. 1227 (1970). It encourages the states to formulate
their own solid waste management programs and mandates the closing of open
dumps. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6941-6949 (1976).
For the official legislative history of the Act, see H.R. REP. No. 1491, supra
note 5, reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6238. For a comprehen-
sive analysis of the Act, see Andersen, The Resource Conservation and Recov-
ery Act of 1976: Closing the Gap, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 633; Kovacs & Klucsik, The
New Federal Role in Solid Waste Management: The Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976, 3 COLUM. J. ENV''L L. 205 (1977).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b) (1976). Once identified, potentially harmful sub-
stances are placed on an official list. Id. The law requires the EPA to develop
criteria for determining the characteristics of regulated hazardous substances.
Id. § 6921(a). See Committee on Environmental Controls, ABA Section of Cor-
poration, Banking, and Business Law, The Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act of 1976-The Newest Environmental "Sleeper," 33 Bus. LAw. 2555, 2559 (July
1978) [hereinafter cited as ABA Section, RCRA ]. The law also allows any state
[Vol. 64.949
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disposers of such substances to a comprehensive manifest sys-
tem.14 Under the Act, the EPA is authorized to initiate court
action to force the cleanup of an abandoned site that poses an
imminent hazard to the environment or the public health.'5
The statute expressly preserves a private individual's right to
seek relief under existing statutes or common law, but it does
not provide an explicit compensatory right of action.16
governor to petition the EPA administrator "to identify or list a material as
hazardous waste." 42 U.S.C. § 6921(c) (1976).
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6922-6924 (1976). All generators, transporters, and dispos-
ers of hazardous substances must keep detailed records of hazardous sub-
stance storage; each owner or operator of a treatment, storage, or disposal
facility is required to apply for and obtain a permit to operate the facility. 42
U.S.C. § 6925(a) (1976). See Andersen, supra note 12, at 650.
The Act authorizes the EPA to regulate the construction, maintenance, and
financial support of waste disposal sites. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(4) (1976). These regu-
lations may apply to both owners and operators of hazardous waste treatment,
storage, and disposal facilities (TSDF). Id. See Andersen, supra note 12, at
657.
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6928, 6973 (1976). The EPA admits that it is unclear
whether § 6973 can be used only against disposal site operators or also against
generators who have independently contracted for waste disposal. 9 EVIm.
REP. (BNA) 1909 (1979). The statute provides for civil penalties of up to $25,000
per day of violation, permit revocation, and criminal indictments for knowingly
transporting hazardous wastes to disposal facilities that lack permits. 42 U.S.C.
§ 6928(a), (d) (1976). The emergency provisions of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6973
(1976), the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1364 (1976 & Supp. I 1977), and Safe
Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300i (1976) are analyzed in Skaff, The Emer-
gency Powers in the Environmental Protection Statutes: A Suggestion for a
Unified Emergency Provision, 3 HARv. ENVT'L L. REV. 298, 298 n.7 (1979).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1976). The legislative history indicates tha the pri-
mary concern of the authors of the bill was prevention of future harm rather
than compensation for past harms. The Act was clearly a response to per-
ceived problems, including the scarcity of land-fill sites, state bans on importa-
tion of wastes, the balance of trade deficit, and the effects of discarded
hazardous wastes. H.R. REP. No. 1491, supra note 5, at 3-4, reprinted in [1976]
U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 6238, 6240-41. The goal of the Act was primarily to
counterbalance the economic pressures to dispose of hazardous wastes in envi-
ronmentally unsafe manners. Compensation of victims is not mentioned in the
official House Report, id. In looking back, one House committee has stated that
Congress simply did not anticipate the problems associated with abandoned
sites and victim compensation. HAzARDOUS WASTE DIsposAL, supra note 2, at
47.
Unfortunately, the effectiveness of the statute was undermined by repeated
delays in the promulgation of regulations. See 10 ENvm. REP. (BNA) 1673
(1979). Proposed regulations were issued at several different times: 1) Criteria
for listing hazardous waste and specific substances subject to RCRA require-
ments, 43 Fed. Reg. 58,946, 58,957-68 (Dec. 18, 1978); 44 Fed. Reg. 49,402-04 (Aug.
22, 1979); 2) Hazardous waste management requirements for generators and
owners/operators of TSDF, see note 14 supra, 43 Fed. Reg. 58,946-22 (Dec. 18,
1978); 3) Standards for hazardous waste transporters, 43 Fed. Reg. 18,506-12
(Apr. 28, 1978) and 43 Fed. Reg. 22,626-34 (May 25, 1978); 4) Notification require-
ments for generators, transporters, treaters, storers, and disposers of hazardous
wastes, 43 Fed. Reg. 29,908-16 (July 11, 1978); 5) Regulations governing the issu-
1980]
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The Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 (TSCA)'7 regu-
lates the manufacture and distribution of new chemicals that
may ultimately harm the environment or public health and re-
quires monitoring of all such chemicals currently in use.18 The
Act empowers the EPA to require testing19 or special handling
of suspected dangerous chemicals as well as to seize them or
ban their use.20 Because the passage of RCRA was uncertain,
Congress authorized the promulgation of regulations concern-
ing the disposal of hazardous materials in TSCA.21 Like RCRA,
TSCA does not provide private individuals with a compensa-
tory right of action.22
The Clean Water Act of 1977 (CWA)23 requires that the
"best available technology economically achievable" be applied
ance of permits for TSDFs and EPA approval of state hazardous waste pro-
grams, 43 Fed. Reg. 34,244-92 (June 14, 1979).
On May 19, 1980, the EPA published final regulations relating to approval of
state hazardous waste programs, classification of hazardous wastes, and stan-
dards applicable to generators of hazardous wastes, 45 Fed. Reg. 33066, 33084,
33140 (1980). See generally 11 ENvm. REP. (BNA) 78 (1980). On the same date,
the EPA proposed revised financial requirements for owners and operators of
hazardous waste facilities, changes in the final list of hazardous wastes, and
modifications in the requirements for underground injection wells. 45 Fed. Reg.
33154, 33260, 33280 (1980).
17. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976). See generally 3 CHEMICAL REG. REP.
(BNA) 858-60 (1979); Caruso, Industry Responsibility for Environmentally
Caused Cancer Under the Toxic Substances Control Act, 7 RUTGERS J. OF COM-
PUTERS, TECH. & L. 213 (1979); Toxic Materials: Industry Tries to Clean Up its
Act, Bus. WEEK (Special Report) 44B (Jan. 29, 1979).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (1976). Three provisions form the nucleus of the
Act. 1) EPA may require testing of any chemical substance or mixture present-
ing potential health or environmental problems, id. § 2603; 2) manufacturers
must give prior notification before manufacturing any new chemical substance
and before manufacturing any existing chemical substance for "any significant
new use," id. § 2604(a); and 3) EPA may require record keeping and reports
about the manufacture of such chemicals, id. § 2607.
19. Id. § 2603.
20. Id. § 2605.
21. Id. § 2605(a) (6) (A). See ABA Section, RCRA, supra note 13, at 2563.
22. In 1978, amendments to TSCA were proposed which would have pro-
vided compensation to individuals harmed by hazardous wastes. H.R. 9616,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); S. 1531, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). The House bill
was identical to a model proposed by Stephen Soble. See Soble, A Proposalfor
the Administrative Compensation of Victims of Toxic Substance Pollution" A
Model Act, 14 HARv. J. LEGis. 683 (1977). Soble's scheme was sharply criticized
by Representative Bob Eckhardt, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Consumer
Protection and Finance. Toxic Substances Control Act Amendments: Hearings
on H.R. 9616 and S. 1531 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Fi-
nance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 263-76 (1978) (statement of Stephen M. Soble). The bills were never en-
acted.
23. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977) (amend-
ing Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376
(1976)) (current version at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. H 1978)).
[Vol. 64:949
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to prevent water pollution,24 mandates more conservation of
nutrients and other materials,25 and establishes maximum
levels of pollutants.26 Section 311 of the Act27 authorizes the
EPA to require reporting of spills of hazardous materials into
waterways and cleanup 28 for which the federal government
may seek reimbursement from the generator, transporter, or
disposer.29 The Act does not, however, provide a private indi-
vidual with a compensatory right of action, nor does it provide
funds to clean up abandoned or inactive hazardous waste dis-
posal sites.
The Safe Drinking Water Act of 197430 sets drinking water
standards that are primarily administered by the states.3' Un-
like the four other statutes, this Act is aimed at both aesthetics
and safety. The Act provides for a uniform, systematic sam-
pling program32 and requires notification to customers if a
water system fails to meet the standards.3 3 In addition, the Act
24. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (2) (A) (1976 & Supp. 1 1977).
25. 33 U.S.C. § 1294 (Supp. I 1979).
26. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1976 & Supp. I 1977). Full compliance is not required
until July 1, 1987. Costle, supra note 10, at 669. Costle estimates that more than
"eighty-five percent of the major industrial discharges are in compliance with
1977 requirements." Id. at 667.
27. Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act § 311, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1321 (1976).
28. Regulations promulgated under § 311, effective September 28, 1979, es-
tablished reportable quantities for spills of 299 specified substances and require
that notification of such spills be given to the EPA and the Coast Guard. 44
Fed. Reg. 50776 (1979) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. § 117). See 10 ENVMR REP.
(BNA) 1085 (1979). See generally Hall, The Control of Toxic Pollutants Under
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 63 IowA L. REV.
609 (1978).
29. For an analysis of the effectiveness of the civil penalties imposed by
the Clean Water Act, see Comment, The Use of Civil Penalties in Enforcing the
Clean Water Act Amendments of 1977, 1978 U.S.F. I REv. 437. The CWA § 311
clean-up fund contains only $35 million. The Mexican oil spill that hit Texas
beaches in August 1979 may use up to $15 million of this fund. Id. See 10 EN-
v. REP. (BNA) 1086 (1979). A ceiling of $50 million is placed on recovery of
clean-up costs unless the spill was due to willful negligence. Id. at 1085.
One EPA official has criticized the amendments for their failure to cover
spills onto the ground, gaseous spills into the air, spills contaminating ground-
water, and chemicals not on the EPA list. Id. at 1086. EPA Assistant Adminis-
trator Thomas C. Jorling views use of section 311 funds as merely a stop-gap
measure effective until Congress passes a "superfund" to reimburse victims of
hazardous wastes. Id. For discussion of "superfund" proposals, see notes 40-41
infra.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 300f-j(10) (1976 & Supp. I 1977).
31. The standards apply to all public water systems having fifteen or more
service connections or regular service to twenty-five or more people. 42 U.S.C.
§ 300f(4) (1976).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 300j-1 (1976 & Supp. I 1977).
33. Id.. § 300g-3 (1976 & Supp. I 1977).
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regulates underground injection wells, which some generators
and disposers use for disposal of hazardous wastes.34 Although
private citizens may sue for enforcement of the Act's provi-
sions,35 the Act does not provide victims of improper waste dis-
posal with a right of action for compensation.
The Hazardous Materials Transportation Act of 197536 au-
thorizes the Department of Transportation (DOT) to develop
criteria for labeling, shipping, and handling of hazardous mater-
ials.37 RCRA incorporates DOT regulations established under
this Act by requiring "that any hazardous waste which meets
the DOT criteria for a hazardous material must be handled in
accordance with the provisions of the DOT hazardous materials
regulations in addition to EPA regulations."3 8 The Hazardous
Materials Transportation Act provides for civil and criminal
penalties,39 not for citizen enforcement or compensation suits.
In addition to benefitting from the existing federal statutes,
hazardous waste victims may someday benefit from several
bills now before Congress, including a number of "superfund"
proposals which would create a large indemnification fund.40
The proposals differ radically from each other in approach and
coverage, but several of them would impose strict liability on
disposers and generators of hazardous waste.41 Formidable ob-
34. 42 U.S.C. § 300h-2(b)-(d) (1976).
35. Id. § 300j-8. See Costle, supra note 10, at 671-72.
36. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1812.
37. Id. § 1804. The Act defines hazardous materials quite broadly as "sub-
stance[s] or material[s] in a quantity and form which may pose an unreasona-
ble risk to health and safety or property when transported in commerce." Id.
§ 1802(2). The Act also authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to designate
which forms and quantities of substances are hazardous. Id. § 1803. See gener-
ally Frye, Recent Developments in the Transportation of Hazardous Materials,
10 TRANsP. L.J. 97 (1978).
38. Frye, supra note 37, at 102.
39. 49 U.S.C. § 1809 (1976).
40. The term "superfund" was first applied to the proposed Comprehen-
sive Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation Act, S. 1187, § 102(a), 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1977). For a discussion of that bill, plus an analysis of the limitations
of similar acts previously passed, see Comment, A Comprehensive Oil Pollution
Liability and Compensation Act: How Super is the "Superfund"? 1978 DET.
C.L. REV. 277. But see Milhollin, Long-term Liability for Environmental Harm,
41 U. Prrr. L. RE V. 1 (1979) (author advocates indemnification fund for victims
of long-term environmental harms).
41. Several bills have been introduced to provide indemnification for vari-
ous groups of people and various types of injuries.
President Carter's proposal provides for cleanup of both oil and hazardous
substances spills and abandoned hazardous waste sites by adding a new sec-
tion to the Federal Water Pollution Control and Solid Waste Disposal Acts.
The scheme would be funded by federal, state, and local governments as well
as industry. The bill would allow third parties to recover limited damages. Oil,
Hazardous Substances, and Hazardous Waste Response, Liability and Compen-
[Vol. 64.949
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stacles must be overcome before a comprehensive compensa-
tion fund can be realized 42 It is, therefore, unlikely that such a
fund will be available in the near future to provide relief for
victims.
B. STATE STATUTES
Many states have regulations that apply to hazardous
wastes. A recent National Wildlife Federation survey of state
toxic waste programs, however, concluded that such state regu-
latory schemes fail to solve the problems posed by hazardous
wastes.43 As of the first quarter of 1979, only seven states had
laws governing specific toxic substances and only thirteen
sation Act of 1979 (introduced as H.R. 4566, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); and S.
1341, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1979)).
Congressman James J. Florio introduced a bill, H.R. 5790, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979), that provides only for cleanup of abandoned hazardous waste
sites. Florio's proposal would raise $1.3 billion over a four-year period from in-
dustry fees (75% of the fund) and federal government appropriations (25% of
the fund). This bill would not explicitly provide third-party damages to victims
but would change liability requirements to make court recovery easier. 10 EN-
vm. REP. (BNA) 1477 (1979).
Congressman Bob Eckhardt has proposed a bill that would use only federal
appropriations to pay for cleanup of abandoned sites and impose an industry
fee system to pay for cleanup of future sites. 10 ENVIn. REP. (BNA) 1819 (1980).
Eckhardt's bill would impose strict liability on owners and operators of future
sites. Id. at 1820.
Senators Edmund Muskie and John Culver have proposed a bill, S. 1480,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), that would provide a fund of $500 million for
cleanup of hazardous substances spills and abandoned hazardous waste dispo-
sal sites. Id. at 19. The Muskie-Culver proposal, like those of Carter and Florio,
would impose some measure of strict liability on generators, transporters, and
disposers of hazardous wastes. Id. at 15. A proposed revision would place sev-
eral limitations on the bill, including- (1) a six-year statute of limitations from
the date of initial exposure (under common law, the statute generally would
not toll until the plaintiff should have reasonably discovered the injury); and
(2) liability limited to the portion each party contributed to the spill instead of
the original joint, several, and strict liability. 10 ENvni. REP. (BNA) 1976-77
(1980).
Many issues remain unresolved, see 10 ENviR. REP. (BNA) 1242 (1979), and
many industry officials remain opposed to any such legislation. See id. at 1163-
65, 1425. Even if a superfund bill is passed, it is unlikely to be comprehensive:
No piece of legislation, especially in a new and problematic area, can
hope to ameliorate all current grievances. The gaps in legislation have
always been the domain of the courts; where private persons are ag-
grieved by violations of pollution laws, a pragmatic remedy must be
made available as an alternative to an administrative hearing.
Note, Private Remedies for Water Pollution, 70 COLUm. I. RE V. 734, 749 (1970).
42. The chemical industry strongly opposes such proposals. See 10 ENvIE.
REP. (BNA) 2001 (1979); id. at 1163-65.
43. Kamlet, Toxic Substances Programs in U.S. States and Territories:
How Well Do They Work? III (Scientific and Technical Series 4, National Wild-
life Federation 1979).
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states had granted an agency or official overall responsibility
for regulating toxic substances.44 More than a third of the
states do not hold waste generators liable when damage caused
by the toxic wastes occurs after the wastes are turned over to a
licensed waste disposal firm,45 and more than a quarter of the
states exempt on-site hazardous waste disposal from require-
ments that would apply if the wastes were stored off-site.46 Al-
most half the states do not require an assessment of the
chemical content of wastes destined for landfills,47 and approxi-
mately three-quarters of the states fail to require labels for
waste containers disposed of in landfills.48
Federal and state legislation, no matter how extensive, is
likely to leave gaps that only courts can fil.49 The history of
RCRA provides a clear example. The House Committee that
recommended passage of RCRA claimed optimistically "that
the approach taken by this legislation eliminates the last re-
maining loophole in environmental law."50 Three years after
the Act was passed, however, it was apparent that several loop-
holes remained. The chairman of the subcommittee conducting
RCRA's reauthorization hearings recognized that the Act "does
not contain authority to deal with the serious health and envi-
ronmental threats posed by inactive and abandoned dumpsites
for hazardous wastes." 51 Furthermore, gaps in recovery are
likely to remain-even if the "superfund" legislation is en-
44. Id. at 2. Colorado, for example, currently has no safe disposal site for
hazardous wastes nor any state agency with overall authority to regulate haz-
ardous wastes. 10 Evia. REP. (BNA) 1902 (1980). Several states, however, are
in the process of adopting hazardous waste laws modeled after RCRA, includ-
ing, for example, Kentucky, see 10 ENvm. REP. (BNA) 1488 (1979); Massachu-
setts, see id. at 1695; and Missouri, see id. at 1294. For a general overview and
comparison of Minnesota laws with proposed federal regulations under the
RCRA, see HAZARDous WASTE MANAGEMENT, supra note 6, at 111-49 to -69.
45. Kamlet, supra note 43, at II.
46. Id. at 4.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Note, supra note 41, at 734-35. "While the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act and its local progeny have made great advances in formulating worka-
ble criteria for pollution control, private remedies must still be utilized in the
face of ineffective administrative enforcement." Id. (footnotes omitted).
50. I.LR REP. No., 1491, supra note 5, at 4, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & An. NEws 6238, 6241.
51. Reauthorization of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Resource Protection of the Comm. on Environment
and Public Works, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1979) (opening statement of Senator
John C. Culver). Environmentalists have articulately indicated the RCRA's
shortcomings. See Goldfarb, supra note 6, at 255-59. In response to such criti-
cism, Congress is considering several amendments to the Act. See 10 EVM.
REP. (BNA) 1750-51 (1979); id. at 78-79.
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acted-because administrative enforcement may be ineffective
and because of the amounts recoverable may be limited.
M. TORT THEORIES OF RECOVERY
Because statutory remedies often fail to provide victims of
improper hazardous waste disposal with compensation, such
victims must turn to common law theories of relief.52 Unfortu-
nately, the customary theories-trespass, nuisance, and negli-
gence--offer little help for such victims. 53
A. TRESPASS
An action for trespass is usually limited to protection of a
plaintiff's present possessory interest in land.54 To prevail in a
trespass action, a plaintiff must prove a direct physical invasion
of his propertySS Liability is imposed both for intentional inva-
sions and for unintentional, non-negligent invasions that are
caused by an abnormally dangerous activity.5 6 Once a plaintiff
52. There are many cases in which private landowners have sued oil, gas,
and mining companies for damages caused by improper disposal of wastes. See
generally Davis, Groundwater Pollution" Case Law Theories for Relief, 39 Mo.
L. REV. 117, 147-56 (1974); Comment, Private Actions for Damages Resulting
from Offshore Oil Pollution, 2 COLUM. J. ENv'rL L. 140, 151-69 (1975). Cases in-
volving improper disposal of hazardous wastes generated by private manufac-
turers, however, are relatively rare. Because of the threat of extensive damage
awards and widespread publicity, most companies prefer to settle claims out of
court. A recent $15 million to $20 million out-of-court settlement between the
state of Michigan and Hooker Chemical Company illustrates the lengths to
which hazardous waste generators are willing to go to avoid trial. See 10 ENvi.
REP. (BNA) 1482 (1979). Hooker agreed to construct clay vaults to store chemi-
cal wastes that had been improperly disposed of at its 800-acre Montague,
Michigan plant site. In addition, the company agreed to monitor the vaults for
at least fifty years and to give the Michigan attorney general "a permanent
right to approve all future uses of the disposal site." See also Consent Order of
Settlement and Dismissal, New Jersey v. Union Carbide Corp., No. C-1597-75
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Apr. 21, 1977) (on file with the Minnesota Law Review)
(agreement by Union Carbide to pay up to $60,000 for testing and treating water
contaminated by its allegedly improper disposal of hazardous chemical wastes)
(complaint summarized in ENVr'L L. REP. (Pending Litigation) (E.L.L) 65310
(April 1976)).
53. For a brief but valuable discussion of the problems posed by traditional
tort litigation in cases involving toxic wastes, see Soble, supra note 22, at 703-14.
See also Milhollin, supra note 40, at 5-12.
54. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 13, at 63 (4th ed. 1971).
55. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 166 (1965).
56. W. PROSSER, supra note 54, § 60, at 63-65. Cf. notes 106-115 infra and
accompanying text (extension of strict liability to hazardous waste cases). One
commentator describes the relationship between trespass and strict liability:
"Originally, the trespass action offered the important advantage of imposing
strict liability .... Today, the old rule is 'almost at its last gasp in the United
States,' and the prevailing position requires an intentional intrusion, negli-
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establishes a trespass, the defendant is liable for any tangible
damage that the trespass has caused to the possessor's person,
family, or chattel, even though such damage might not have
been foreseeable. 57
Plaintiffs bringing trespass actions have had limited suc-
cess in pollution cases5 8 and will probably have little success in
hazardous waste suits. Obviously, trespass theory will not aid
victims who are injured on land not in their possession. 59 Even
owners of land have had difficulty winning compensation under
the trespass theory, since they must establish that their land
was directly invaded.60 Although at least one court has allowed
recovery under a trespass theory for gas and particulate emis-
sions from a manufacturing plant,61 most courts treat such
cases as nuisance actions.62
B. NUISANCE
Trespass theory protects a landowner's right to exclusive
possession of land; private nuisance theory protects a land-
owner's right to the use and enjoyment of land.63 To prevail in
gence, or some abnormally dangerous activity." Comment, supra note 52, at 165
(footnotes omitted).
57. W. PROSSER, supra note 54, § 13, at 67.
58. See, e.g., Curry Coal v. Arnoni, 1 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1428, 1429, 1431 (1970)
(sanitary landfill operator, who continued to dump industrial sludge above a
coal mine after receiving notice of harm it was causing, liable for intentional
trespass damages; but independent contractor and steel company that con-
tracted for sludge removal not liable, since coal company failed to establish
that independent contractor did not use due care).
59. See note 5 supra.
60. For example, most of the damage at the Love Canal site was caused by
seepage of chemicals. See note 4 supra. Faced with a similar fact situation,
most courts would probably fail to find that a trespass had occurred. See Note,
The Viability of Common Law Actions for Pollution-Caused Injuries and Proof
of Facts, 18 N.Y.L.F. 935, 939 (1973).
61. See Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 221 Or. 86, 101, 342 P.2d 790, 797
(1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 918 (1960).
62. See Note, supra note 60, at 939.
63. See W. PaossER, supra note 54, § 89, at 591-92. This Note does not dis-
cuss public nuisance, which protects a wide variety of interests common to the
general public, because it is largely unavailable as a theory of recovery for pri-
vate citizens. Plaintiffs must prove special damages under a public nuisance
cause of action. See Comment, Groundwater Polluttion in the Western States-
Private Remedies and Federal and State Legislation, 8 LAND AND WATER REV.
537, 545 (1973). Restrictive standing requirements imposed by courts also limit
the availability of this action to public officials or private individuals who suffer
harm different in kind from that suffered by the general public. See W. PRos-
sER, supra note 54, § 88, at 586-87. The standing requirement is based on the
rationale that public officials can best represent the public's interest. See Illi-
nois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151 (1979). See also Prosser, Private Action
for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L REV. 997, 1004-08 (1966).
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a private nuisance action, a plaintiff must prove substantial in-
terference with his "interest in the private use and enjoyment
of land" by conduct that is either "intentional and unreasona-
ble" or "unintentional and otherwise actionable."64 Compared
with trespass actions, private nuisance actions reach a wider
variety of invasions, including loud noises, obnoxious smells,
unsightly views, and interferences with physical comfort and
health.65 Unlike trespass liability, however, nuisance liability
requires proof of some injury beyond mere physical invasion of
land.66
Private nuisance theory offers limited aid to hazardous
waste victims. 67 Nuisance theory does not aid victims who do
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1979). To be otherwise action-
able, the unintentional invasion must be caused by negligent or reckless con-
duct or by an abnormally dangerous activity to which strict liability applies. Id.
See generally Comment, Elements of a Private Nuisance-Copart Industries,
Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc., 44 BROOKLYN L. REV. 703
(1978). For a history of the origins of nuisance law, see generally McRae, The
Development of Nuisance in the Early Common Law, 1 U. FLA. L REV. 27
(1948).
65. See Note, supra note 60, at 940-41. Another advantage of nuisance the-
ory is that some courts are willing to hold employers or lessors liable for nui-
sances created by their employees or lessees. See Daigle v. Continental Oil
Co., 277 F. Supp. 875 (W.D. La. 1967) (holding lessor liable for nuisance damage
caused by lessee's carbon black plant when lessor knew of proposed use);
Bleeda v. Hickman-Williams & Co., 44 Mich. App. 29, 37, 205 N.W.2d 85, 90 (1972)
(holding employer liable for nuisance created by independent contractor in
coke screening process when employer knew or had reason to know nuisance
was the likely result of process).
66. W. PROSSER, supra note 54, at 577-80.
67. See generally Note, Private Nuisance Law: Protection of the Individ-
ual's Environmental Rights, 8 SuFFoiK U.L. REV. 1162 (1974). Village of Wil-
sonville v. Earthline Corp., 11 Envir. Rep. Cas. 2137 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 1978), aff'd sub
nom. Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Servs., Inc., 13 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1809 (Ill.
App. 1979), offers a dramatic but isolated contrast to the ineffectiveness of nui-
sance theory. The court in Earthline granted an injunction prohibiting further
waste disposal in a landfill site near Wilsonville, Illinois, and requiring the re-
moval of hazardous chemical wastes and any contaminated soil from the area.
Village of Wilsonville v. Earthline Corp., 11 Envir. Rep. Cas. at 2148-49. The
case is unusual because the court ruled that the plaintiffs need not establish
that the harm was likely to occur but merely that if it did occur, the harm
would be substantial. Id. at 2147. The court seemed to ignore testimony of
EPA officials that the disposal operation met all statutory standards and that
without the facility "midnight dumpers" were likely to dispose of hazardous
wastes illegally. See Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Servs., Inc., 13 Envir. Rep.
Cas. at 1818. See also Toxic Materials: Industry Tries to Clean Up its Act
supra note 17, at 440-44P.
Most jurisdictions have not been willing to extend nuisance law this far.
See, e.g., McQuail v. Shell Oil Co., 40 Del. Ch. 410, 183 A.2d 581 (1962) (uphold-
ing dismissal of action to enjoin construction and operation of oil refinery be-
cause complaint only alleged apprehension of nuisance); Hays v. Hartfield L-P
Gas, 159 Ind. App. 297, 306 N.E.2d 373 (1974) (upholding denial of injunction to
stop planned operation of bulk liquid propane tanks and holding that mere fear
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not own or possess land. Furthermore, even landowners can
have difficulty recovering under a nuisance theory because
they must establish both a substantial and unreasonable inter-
ference. Although most hazardous waste victims would have
no difficulty demonstrating a substantial interference, they
might have difficulty establishing that the interference was un-
reasonable. 68 For example, if the plaintiff moved into an area
knowing it was near a hazardous dump, a court might conclude
that an invasion was not unreasonable since the plaintiff had
"come to the nuisance."69
Even if a plaintiff establishes the necessary private nui-
sance elements, the court may limit the remedy by "balancing
the equities." Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.70 illustrates some
of the difficulties of this balancing process. In Boomer, the trial
court found that the defendant cement company's emission of
dust and other pollutants constituted a nuisance even though
the plant had taken "every available and possible precaution"
to prevent such emissions.7 1 The Court of Appeals of New
York, however, balanced the private harm to nearby citizens
against the economic interests of the community and the com-
pany and refused to shut down the plant immediately. The
court instead granted an injunction conditioned on defendant's
payment of permanent damages to the plaintiffs.72
Applying the principles of Boomer, a court in a hazardous
waste case might find a nuisance, yet deny injunctive relief if
the injunction would cause more harm to the defendant or soci-
ety than the continuation of the nuisance would cause to the
plaintiff.7 3 In addition, because the toxic effects of hazardous
wastes are not readily apparent, it may be difficult for a plain-
tiff to obtain an injunction on the basis of an immediate and
of explosion from 30,000 gallon liquid propane gas tank located within 300 feet
of plaintiff's home did not establish a nuisance). Nevertheless, a court has
granted injunctive relief where the defendant's storage of explosive chemicals
did not merely create an apprehension but did severely limit the plaintiff's ac-
tual use of his land. See Hilliard v. Shuff, 260 La. 384, 390-91, 256 So. 2d 127
(1971) (injunctive relief granted to landowner who could not safely operate an
auto, truck, or power-mower on his own property within at least fifty feet of
crude oil storage tanks located on defendant's adjacent land).
68. See Note, supra note 67, at 1167-68.
69. Id. at 1171-72. But see Note, supra note 41, at 744 (identifying a "preva-
lent trend to disregard" the coming-to-the-nuisance rule).
70. 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
71. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 55 Misc. 2d 1023, 1024, 287 N.Y.S.2d 112,
113-14 (1967), affid, 30 App. Div. 2d 480, 482, 294 N.Y.S.2d 452, 454 (1968), rev'd, 26
N.Y.2d 219, 228, 257 N.E.2d 870, 875, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 319 (1970).
72. 26 N.Y.2d at 225, 257 N.E.2d at 873, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 316-17.
73. See Note, supra note 67, at 1175-83.
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certain threat.74 If temporary damages are granted in lieu of an
injunction, the plaintiff may obtain further relief only by re-
turning to court.7 5 If permanent damages are granted, the de-
fendant will have little incentive to clean up existing pollution
or change current operating procedures. In effect, the court
will have sold the defendant a "license to pollute."76
C. NEGLIGENCE
Common law negligence and negligence based on statutory
duty and on implied rights of action under federal statutes offer
closely related theories on which hazardous waste victims can
seek compensation. Groundwater pollution cases, which are
analogous to hazardous waste cases, illustrate some of the
problems presented by negligence actions.7 7 In the typical
groundwater case, the plaintiff has to demonstrate that the de-
fendant had a duty not to pollute, that a causal connection ex-
isted between the pollution and the defendant's failure to
perform his duty, and that the plaintiff suffered actual loss. 78
Traditional negligence theory imposes a difficult burden of
proof on plaintiffs in hazardous waste cases, as a recent Louisi-
ana case illustrates. In Ewell v. Petro Processors of Louisiana,
Inc.,7 9 plaintiffs, who owned land adjoining an industrial waste
disposal site, brought a negligence suit against the corporation
that operated the site and the corporate customers who gener-
ated the waste, alleging damage caused by leakage of waste
onto the plaintiffs' land. The Louisiana Court of Appeals held
the site operator liable for negligently permitting the toxic
materials to escape, but refused to find any waste generators
negligent absent a showing that that generator knew or had
reason to know of the leakage.80 On the facts presented at trial,
the court held only one of the waste-generating customers lia-
ble.81 In addition, the court applied the independent contractor
rule, which cuts off an employer's liability for the harm caused
by a hired contractor unless the activity is intrinsically danger-
74. See generally Soble, supra note 22, at 703-14; Milhoflin, supra note 40,
at 11-12 (discussing analogous problem with statutes of limitations).
75. Note, supra note 60, at 1168.
76. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 230, 257 N.E.2d 870, 876,
309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 321 (1970) (Jasen, J., dissenting).
77. Davis, supra note 52, at 120. See W. PROSSER, supra note 54, § 30, at 143
(elements of cause of action founded upon negligence).
78. Comment, supra note 63, at 546.
79. 364 So. 2d 604 (La. Ct. App. 1978).
80. Id. at 607.
81. Id. at 608.
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ous. 82 The court refused to rule that hazardous waste disposal
is intrinsically dangerous.8 3
In most cases, the requirement that the plaintiff prove the
generator's knowledge of the risk of harm presents a formida-
ble barrier to recovery. Waste generators often assiduously
avoid the appearance of such knowledge in order to prevent lia-
bility, and evidence of their knowledge is often destroyed.84
The plaintiffs inability to use the "intrinsically dangerous" ex-
ception to the independent contractor rule is a further barrier.
A corporate customer may be in a better financial position to
compensate victims of improper disposal than the contractor
who actually disposes of the wastes. In Ewell, for example, the
contractor was a small company, but its corporate customers
included Humble Oil & Refining, Dow Chemical, and Uniroyal.85
The difficulties presented by traditional negligence theory
can overcome in part by using a statutory standard of negli-
gence. In a majority of jurisdictions a violation of a statutory
standard of care8 6 is treated either as conclusive evidence of
the defendant's breach of a duty of care or as negligence per se.
In other jurisdictions a statutory violation is treated merely as
evidence upon which the trier of fact can infer a breach of a
duty of care or as a rebuttal presumption of negligence. 87
82. Id. at 606. See W. PROSSER, supra note 54, § 71, at 470-73. See also RE-
STATEMENT OF TORTS § 427A (1938).
83. 364 So. 2d at 606-07. The Ewell court limits the employer's liability ex-
ception for inherently dangerous activities to only those activities that no pre-
caution can render safe or to those activities that can be done safely but that
are in fact done in an unsafe manner expressly or impliedly authorized by the
employer. The court concludes that hazardous waste disposal falls in the latter
category and thus requires the employer's express or implied authorization of
the improper method of disposal. This requirement creates a difficult burden of
proof for the plaintiff.
84. In many cases evidence of negligence will be destroyed at the time the
plaintiff is harmed by hazardous wastes. For example, a spill might result in a
fire or explosion that destroys any sign of the cause of the accident. See also
Siegler v. Kuhlman, 81 Wash. 2d 448, 455-56, 502 P.2d 1181i 1185, cert. denied, 411
U.S. 983 (1973) (imposing strict liability on transporter of gasoline that ex-
ploded after spilling from trailer that had broken away from truck and crashed-,
discussing the burden-of-proof problems under a negligence theory in such
cases).
85. 364 So. 2d at 606.
86. See W. PROssER, supra note 54, § 36, at 190.
87. Id. at 200-01. For an early application of the principle of negligence per
se, see Osborne v. McMasters, 40 Minn. 103, 41 N.W. 543 (1889). One author has
recently suggested the possibility of using FWPCA and RCRA as the per se
standard for negligence in municipal sludge composting enterprises. See Pass-
man, Composting Municipal Sludge: Public Health and Legal Implications, 3
HAzv. ENVT'L L REV. 381, 396 (1979). Prosser summarizes negligence per se as
follows:
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In order to use a statute to establish a standard of care, the
plaintiff must show that he is a member of the class protected
by the statute, and that his injury is the type of harm the stat-
ute was designed to prevent.88 In addition to establishing both
the statute's applicability and the defendant's violation of the
statute, the plaintiff must still establish injury and cause in
fact.89 In some jurisdictions, defendants are allowed to assert
excuses for the violation or raise the affirmative defenses of
contributory negligence and assumption of risk.90 Hazardous
waste victims can effectively assert a negligence claim based on
the violation of a statute in those jurisdictions that recognize
statutory violations as conclusive proof of unreasonable con-
duct. Although precedent is almost nonexistent,9 1 one recent
case suggests in dictum that federal statutes should be used to
extend common law liability.92
Courts often give one or more of the following rationales
for adopting a statutory standard of care: 1) the legislature de-
cides what is reasonable conduct in the particular circum-
stances and embodies that conduct in a statute; 2) the
legislature presumably investigates and considers issues more
broadly than the courts do, therefore, the courts should defer to
the legislative determination; 3) the adoption of the statutory
standard provides greater predictability and certainty than an
undefined reasonable person standard.93 All of these policies
would be furthered by using the standards developed under
RCRA, TSCA, FWPCA, and HMTA as the bench marks of rea-
sonable conduct in hazardous waste cases.
Few state courts have discussed the possibility of utilizing
these federal statutes to define negligent conduct. The court in
Once the statute is determined to be applicable-which is to say, once
it is interpreted as designed to protect the class of persons in which the
plaintiff is included, against the risk of the type of harm which has in
fact occurred as a result of its violation-the great majority of the
courts hold that an unexcused violation is conclusive on the issue of
negligence, and that the court must so direct the jury.
W. PROSSER, supra note 54, § 36, at 200 (footnotes omitted).
88. Id. at 192-97.
89. Id. at 201.
90. Id.
91. See Comment, supra note 52, at 153.
92. See City of Bridgeton v. B.P. Oil, Inc., 146 N.J. Super. 169, 177, 369 A.2d
49, 53-54 (1976): "In view of our developing insight into the impact of pollution
upon the environment because of the nature of this activity and the statutory
prohibition against pollution, this is the proper time to extend the concept of
strict liability in this State to those who store ultra-hazardous or pollutant sub-
stances." (emphasis added).
93. See, e.g., Clinkscales v. Carver, 22 Cal. 2d 72, 136 P.2d 777 (1943).
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Steagall v. Dot Manufacturing Corp.94 indicated in dictum that
it would be willing to infer negligence per se from a federal
statute, the Federal Hazardous Substances Labeling Act,9 5 but
on the particular facts of the case found no proximate cause.9 6
Occasionally, federal courts in diversity actions have assumed
that state courts use a federal statute to establish negligence
per se.9 7
In non-diversity suits, some federal courts have been will-
ing to find an implied right of action in federal statutes.98 In
Cort v. Ash,99 the Supreme Court outlined the factors that
courts should consider in deciding whether to infer a private
right of action from a statute: 1) whether the plaintiff is a mem-
ber of a class the statute intended to benefit; 2) whether there
is legislative intent to create or deny such a remedy; 3)
whether inferring such a right from the statute is consistent
with the statute's purpose; and 4) whether the remedy is one
traditionally left to state law.100
Arguably, a court could find an implied federal right of ac-
tion based on the federal statutes governing hazardous waste
disposal discussed previously.101 The legislative history of
RCRA reveals that Congress' "overriding concern" in passing
that statute was to minimize "the effect on the population and
the environment of the disposal of discarded hazardous
94. 223 Tenn. 428, 446 S.W.2d 515 (1969).
95. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-1274 (1976).
96. 223 Tenn. at 432, 446 S.W.2d at 517.
97. See, e.g., Gober v. Revlon, Inc., 317 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1963). But see Otto
v. Specialties, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 1240 (N.D. Miss. 1974) (refusing to imply civil
action from Occupational Safety and Health Act and expressing belief that
state court would not find a violation of the statute to be negligence per se).
98. Such rights of action have most often been found in securities cases,
see, e.g., JI. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), and in civil rights cases, see,
e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971). See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). The Supreme Court in Can-
non v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), stressed that statutes that
benefit a specific class of individuals were more likely to be the basis for im-
plied rights of action than statutes that merely prohibit a general type of action.
Id. at 1954-55. See also Note, Emerging Standards for Implied Actions Under
Federal Statutes, 9 U. Mxcii. J. L R.F. 294 (1976).
99. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
100. Id. at 78.
101. Such an implied right would have to be based on RCRA, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6901-6987 (1976), or TSCA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2699 (1976), and not on CWA, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. I 1977). CWA, unlike the other two statutes,
contains a provision specifying that nothing in the Act "shall affect or modify in
any way the obligations" at common law of an offshore or onshore facility. 33
U.S.C. § 1321(o) (1) (1976). See also Comment, supra note 52, at 155.
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wastes." 0 2 Similarly, the legislative history of TSCA indicates
that its purpose "is to prevent unreasonable risks of injury to
health or the environment associated with the manufacture,
processing, distribution in commerce, use, or disposal of chemi-
cal substances. [TSCA] is designed to fill a number of regula-
tory gaps which currently exist." 03 Judicial consideration of
other factors, however, might persuade a court not to find such
an implied right. A court might rule that the statutes were in-
tended to benefit the general public and thus confer no special
right on a particular class of individuals.104 Alternatively, a
court might hold that since pollution damage has historically
been litigated in state courts, it is inappropriate to infer a fed-
eral right of action. 05
It is difficult to predict whether a court might treat viola-
tion of a statute as conclusive evidence of negligence or might
infer a private right of action from existing statutes. Strict lia-
bility treats aggrieved parties more equitably than either these
or common law theories. In the past, courts have expanded
strict liability to new classes of defendants when plaintiffs
demonstrate both the need for a new remedy and the factual
and policy parallels to other areas in which courts presently
impose the theory.
IV. STRICT LIABILTY FOR GENERATORS AND
DISPOSERS OF HAZARDOUS WASTES
Many commentators suggest that the impetus for the trend
to expand the availability of strict liabilitylo6 is a shift in atti-
tudes concerning the environment and business.107 As aware-
102. H.R. REP. No. 1491, supra note 5, at 3, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 6238, 6241.
103. S. REP. No. 698, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [19761 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4491.
104. In recent cases the Supreme Court has limited the implication of pri-
vate rights of action. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677
(1979) (recognizing an implied right of action under title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976), but narrowing such right to plain-
tiffs clearly within an intended beneficiary class); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441
U.S. 281 (1979) (refusing to infer a federal right of action from the Freedom of
Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976), or the Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905
(1976), holding that neither statute was enacted to benefit a special class of per-
sons).
105. See text accompanying note 91 supra.
106. The doctrine of strict liability is a dramatic example of "how legal sys-
tems adjust themselves.., to the emerging needs of time and place." Muskie,
Torts, Transportation, and Pollution" Do the Old Shoes Still Fit?, 7 H Av. J.
LEGS. 477, 478 (1970). See also Annot., 56 A.L.R.3d 1017, 1020 (1974).
107. See Avins, Absolute Liability for Oil Spillage, 36 BROOKLYN L. REV. 359
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ness of the environmental spoliation caused by industry has
increased, legislatures and courts have begun to favor strict lia-
bility as a method of forcing an industry to bear all the costs
and risks of its economic activity. 0 8
Extending strict liability to hazardous waste cases would
effectuate the statutory policy underlying TSCAO9 and
RCRA.110 Although these statutes evince a congressional pol-
icy to eliminate improper hazardous waste disposal and protect
the environment and public health, the resources appropriated
by statute are inadequate to accomplish these goals.Il' By im-
posing strict liability, courts would, in effect, force generators
and disposers of hazardous wastes to spend private funds to
develop more efficient and safer disposal practices; improper
disposal would no longer be economically attractive.112
Standards established by these federal statutes could aid a
court in determining when to impose strict liability.113 For ex-
(1970). For analyses of the recent trend to return to liability without fault, see
Baxter & Altree, Legal Aspects of Airport Noise, 15 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1972); Cala-
bresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055
(1972); Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARv. L. REV. 537
(1972); Comment, The Rylands v. Fletcher Doctrine in America Abnormally
Dangerous, Ultrahazardous, or Absolute Nuisance?, 1978 ARiz. ST. L.J. 99. How-
ever, not all commentators support such an expansion. Professor Richard Pos-
ner argues that commentators have failed to make a convincing case for
expanding strict liability because they have failed to analyze correctly the eco-
nomic consequences of such an expansion. See Posner, Strict Liability: A
Comment, 2 J. LEG. STUD. 205 (1973).
108. See, e.g., United States v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 589 F.2d 1305 (7th
Cir. 1978); United States v. Tex-Tow, Inc., 589 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1978); Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b) (6) (1976). For a discussion of
the preceding cases, see Valadez-Ferreira, Liability Without Fault Under the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 19 NAT. REsouRcEs J. 687 (1979). Even
without statutory authority, courts have imposed strict liability on specific ac-
tivities. See, e.g., Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 270 P. 952
(1928) (imposing strict liability upon a nonnegligent oil drilling company for
damage caused to an adjacent landowner by an oil drilling blowout).
109. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976). See notes 17-22 supra and accompanying
text.
110. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976). See notes 11-16 supra and accompanying
text.
111. Although RCRA authorized $25 million in hazardous waste grants each
year for 1978 and 1979, over half of that amount was spent for surveys of aban-
doned hazardous waste disposal sites. See 9 ENvm. REP. (BNA) 1302, 1343
(1978).
112. See Goldfarb, supra note 6, at 257. If new facilities that meet RCRA's
criteria are not developed and RCRA is enforced, the New England Regional
Commission predicts there will be loss of jobs and loss of new business as well
as continued illegal dumping of wastes. See 10 ENvna. REP. (BNA) 1515 (1979).
113. See W. RODGERS, supra note 6, at 162. Rodgers suggests that toxic pol-
lutants and hazardous substances designated under the FWPCA and the Clean
Air Act may be products of abnormally dangerous activities.
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ample, by using the standards of RCRA for the identification of
hazardous wastes, a court would not need to hear extensive ev-
idence on whether a certain substance is hazardous. Applica-
tion of these statutes could aid courts in analyzing cases under
several theories of strict liability, including those theories rep-
resented by Rylands v. Fletcher,114 sections 519 and 520 of the
Restatement of Torts, sections 519 and 520 of the Second Re-
statement of Torts, and finally, section 402A of the Second Re-
statement of Torts. Although many courts fail to distinguish
among these theories,115 they are founded on different ratio-
nales, and accordingly warrant separate discussion.
A. THEORiES OF LiABrrY FOR DANGEROUS AcTivnis
1. Rylands v. Fletcher
The theory of strict liability articulated in Rylands v.
Fletcher'16 appears to be the most logical basis for extending
liability to generators, transporters, and disposers of hazardous
wastes. Most modern courts view Rylands as imposing liability
for the escape of substances likely to cause great harm and for
a dangerous nonnatural use of land.117 Despite initial judicial
hostility in the United States,118 most states now accept some
114. L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
115. See, e.g., Cities Service Co. v. State, 312 So. 2d 799, 802-03 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1975) (discussing Rylands, "ultrahazardous," and "abnormally danger-
ous," with little distinction among them); MacKenzie v. Fitchburg Paper Co.,
351 Mass. 292, 218 N.E.2d 579 (1966) (trial judge's instructions to the jury con-
fuse Rylands with ultrahazardous activity). Courts have contributed to the
confusion by citing both the lower and upper court Rylands opinions. See
Fletcher v. Rylands, 3 H. & C. 774, 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (1865), rev'd, L.R. 1 Ex. 265
(1866), afl'd, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868). The intermediate court stated, "[T]he per-
son who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there
anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril .... .
[1866] L.R. 1 Ex. 265, 279. The upper court, however, narrowed the application
of strict liability to cases involving "non-natural uses" of land. See L.R. 3 H.L.
330 (1868) (on appeal to the Exchequer).
116. L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868). The defendant mill owners had built a large res-
ervoir on their own land to collect water for their business. Because the reser-
voir was built unknowingly over an abandoned mine shaft, water leaked out
and flooded the plaintiffs mine tunnels on adjoining property. Reasoning by
analogy to the strict liability imposed on owners of trespassing cattle and dan-
gerous animals and the strict liability imposed under an absolute nuisance the-
ory, the court allowed the plaintiff to recover. See W. PROSSER, supra note 54,
§ 78, at 505; Avins, supra note 107, at 360.
117. See Comment, supra note 107, at 102.
118. Many American courts were hostile toward Rylands because they in-
correctly assumed that it imposed absolute liability for any escape that caused
damage. See W. PROSSER, supra note 54, § 78, at 508-09. See also Muslie, supra
note 106, at 482.
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form of the Rylands rule.119
A major limitation to a plaintiff's use of the Rylands doc-
trine in the hazardous waste context is the requirement that
the activity involved be "nonnatural."120 In pollution suits
courts have been reluctant to declare polluting industrial activi-
ties in industrial areas "nonnatural." The Texas Supreme
Court's ruling in Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co.121 is typical. The
Turner court held that oil drilling was not a nonnatural use of
land in Texas, and thus refused to impose strict liability for
damage caused by the escape of salt water wastes from oil
drilling operations. 22 Under the principles of Turner, strict lia-
bility for improper disposal of hazardous wastes should not be
imposed in areas of large-scale chemical manufacturing,123
such as New Jersey, Michigan, and Louisiana.
In Fritz v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & C0.,124 the Delaware
Supreme Court applied a rationale similar to that in Turner to
the chemical industry. In Fritz the court refused to hold Du-
Pont strictly liable for an employee's permanent injuries
caused by the escape of chlorine gas:
119. See W. PROSSER, supra note 54, § 78, at 509 n.98. By 1978 only five states
explicitly rejected Rylands by name and even those states covertly recognized
the more limited appellate court opinion in Rylands, under the guise of nui-
sance or trespass theory. See Comment, supra note 107, at 100.
120. Maloney, Judicial Protection of the Environment: A New Role for Com-
mon-Law Remedies, 25 VAD. L. REV. 145, 150-51 (1972). Some American courts
have created confusion by using the term "ultrahazardous activity" as a syno-
nym for nonnatural use of land. See Comment, supra note 107, at 100-01.
121. 128 Tex. 155, 96 S.W.2d 221 (1936). See W. RODGERS, supra note 6.
122. 128 Tex. at 165-66, 96 S.W.2d at 226. The court, however, also noted that
Texas does not impose strict liability for other activities almost universally
classed as nonnatural (blasting and keeping wild animals) because such liabil-
ity is "unsuited to our conditions." Id. at 161-62, 96 S.W.2d at 224. Turner was
followed more recently in a case upholding the repudiation of Rylands. Sun
Pipe Line Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 514 S.W.2d 789, 792 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974). The
court held that the plaintiff must establish negligence to recovery property
damages caused by defendant's crop dusting activities. In addition, the court
showed a great reluctance to hold even dangerous activities "inherently dan-
gerous" as a rule of law and thus refused to apply the exception to the in-
dependent contractor rule. Id. at 794. See notes 82-83 supra and accompanying
text.
123. There may be an additional problem in jurisdictions such as Texas that
refuse to find a harmful activity nonnatural or intrinsically dangerous; a gener-
ator of hazardous wastes might be able to cut off his liability by independently
contracting for disposal. See note 82 supra and accompanying text. Some
courts have, however, been unwilling to allow delegation of responsibility for
dangerous activities. Thus, when there is evidence of a deliberate attempt to
cut off liability by incorporating subsidiaries, courts have been willing to pierce
the corporate veil. See, e.g., United States v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc., 363 F.
Supp. 110, 119 (D. Vt.), afrd mem., 487 F.2d 1393 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 976 (1974).
124. 45 Del. 427, 75 A.2d 256 (1950).
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In the present case it was not unlawful for DuPont to have on its prem-
ises chlorine gas, nor was its presence there unusual, and it cannot be
said that the mere possession of chlorine gas by DuPont without more
was dangerous per se in the light of recognized industrial use. To say
that any corporation or individual possessing or using dangerous sub-
stances upon its or his premises should be held liable as an insurer in
the event of injury to others by reason of the mere possession, use, or
escape thereof would be but to strangle corporate and individual enter-
prise .... 125
The Fritz court did not, however, entirely foreclose the applica-
tion of strict liability to practices that have a "history of doing
injury to others or... their property."'26 Thus, a court could
expand strict liability to include hazardous waste disposal if a
plaintiff provided a carefully documented history of injury con-
nected with the disposal of the particular hazardous wastes in-
volved.127
Despite the possible expansion of strict liability suggested
by Fritz, such expansion is dependent on considerations of lo-
cation. The same court that denied liability in Fritz extended
strict liability to blasting activities in Catholic Welfare Guild,
Inc. v. Brodney Corp.128 The court distinguished the two cases
on the basis of location by noting that in Fritz the DuPont plant
was in an isolated rural area but that in Brodney the blasting
had taken place in a confined urban area.129
One court, ostensibly finding liability under Rylands, has
imposed strict liability on the generator of wastes despite the
prevalence of mining in the area. In Cities Service Co. v.
State, 30 a Florida court held a mining company strictly liable
when a phosphate slime reservoir broke and allowed approxi-
mately one billion gallons of slime to escape. Although the
court recognized that the area was suited to mining, that min-
ing had great economic importance to the area, and that Cities
Service had followed accepted mining practices,131 the court
found that Cities Service's mining was a nonnatural use of
125. Id. at 437-38, 75 A.2d at 261.
126. Id. at 438, 75 A.2d at 261.
127. Hazardous waste designation by the federal government under TSCA
and RCRA should create a strong presumption on the issue. See notes 101-105
supra and accompanying text.
128. 58 DeL 246, 208 A.2d 301 (1964).
129. Id. at 249-50, 208 A.2d at 302-03.
130. 312 So. 2d 799 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975). See also Comment, Strict Lia-
bility for Hazardous Use of One's Land-Impounding Phosphate Slimes in Res-
ervoir Is Non-Natural Use of Lands-Escape of Slimes Invokes Doctrine of
Strict Liability-Cities Service Co. v. State, 4 Ft& ST. U.L. REv. 304 (1976).
131. 312 So. 2d at 801. Florida produced over one-third of the world's
phosphate in 1973.
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land.132 Citing changes in society from early frontier days, the
court set forth a new basis for liability:
In early days it was important to encourage persons to use their land
by whatever means were available for the purpose of commercial and
industrial development.... Today our life has become more complex.
Many areas are overcrowded, and even the non-negligent use of one's
land can cause extensive damages to a neighbor's property. Though
there are still many hazardous activities which are socially desirable, it
now seems reasonable that they pay their own way. It is too much to
ask an innocent neighbor to bear the burden thrust upon him as a con-
sequence of an abnormal use of the land next door.13 3
Cities Service is an important precedent for cases in which
hazardous wastes are stored either on the generator's premises
or in an independent disposer's facility.134 The court's willing-
ness to classify the storage of phosphate slime as a nonnatural
use of the land despite the importance of the mining industry
to Florida suggests a new approach for determining what is
nonnatural. In effect, the court determined the nonnatural
character of the activity by assessing the size of the risk in-
volved.135 Using this approach, a court could classify the stor-
age of hazardous wastes in industrial areas as a nonnatural use
of land if the disposal site is large and the risks it presents are
great. Certainly, a situation like that at the Love Canal would
132. The decision in Cities Service is based on both the Rylands' non-
natural use of the land rationale and the Restatement's ultrahazardous and ab-
normally dangerous activity rationales. Although the court fails to clearly
distinguish among the three, it appears to give decisive weight to the non-
natural use of the land rationale. See 312 So. 2d at 803-04. In an earlier case
cited in Cities Service, Ague v. American Agricultural Chem. Co., 5 Fla. Supp.
133 (Cir. Ct. Hillsborough County 1953), the court, noting the repudiation of Ry-
lands in other states, rejected the application of Rylands to the escape of
phosphate slime from a reservoir. However, the same Florida court, acknowl-
edging the judicial ambivalence toward acceptance of the Rylands rule in the
United States, reversed itself in Caldwell v. American Cyanamid Co., 32 Fla.
Supp. 163 (Cir. Ct. Hillsborough County 1969), and held impoundment of
phosphate slimes a nonnatural use within the meaning of Rylands. Id. at 165.
133. 312 So. 2d at 801 (emphasis added). Despite the Cities Service court's
conclusion that the activity was nonnatural, the opinion does not provide any
new criteria for determining what constitutes nonnatural use of land. Instead,
the court simply concludes that dangerous activities should "pay their own
way." Id. This rationale appears to be an application of enterprise liability the-
ory, see notes 166-194 infra and accompanying text, rather than a traditional Ry-
lands liability theory.
134. Figures vary for on-site disposal. Results of a survey conducted during
the summer of 1979 by the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investiga-
tions, indicate that 94% of the chemical wastes were disposed of on the plant
site by fifty-three of the largest domestic chemical manufacturers. 10 ENvm.
REP. (BNA) 1338 (1979). Earlier data from the EPA suggest that 80% of wastes
are stored on the site where they are generated. 9 id. 2035.
135. See 312 So. 2d at 803.
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meet the Cities Service standard.136
Despite the refinement offered by Cities Service, problems
remain with a Rylands-based action. It is unclear, for instance,
whether a court following the Cities Service approach would
impose liability on a generator that does not store the wastes
on its own premises.137 In such a case, a victim of improper
waste disposal might not recover any damages if the independ-
ent contractor-disposer were bankrupt or minimally solvent. In
addition, there is no consensus of authority on whether liability
under Rylands is limited to situations in which pollutants spill
onto land adjoining the disposal site or is applicable whenever
pollutants escape from a storage place.138 If the former is true,
Rylands would not apply to transporters of hazardous wastes
nor authorize compensation to passers-by. Because it is possi-
ble that courts will adopt the pro-business stance of the Turner
decision and because some courts refuse to apply the Rylands
theory unless adjoining land is involved, Rylands is by itself an
inadequate theory on which to base hazardous waste compen-
sation cases.
2. Restatement of Torts Sections 519 and 520
Often confused with the Second Restatement of Torts "ab-
normally dangerous activity" approach, the original Restate-
ment of Torts limits liability to "ultrahazardous activity."
Section 519 of the Restatement provides:
[o]ne who carries on an ultrahazardous activity is liable to another
whose person, land or chattels the actor should recognize as likely to
be harmed by the unpreventable miscarriage of the activity for harm
resulting thereto from that which makes the activity ultrahazardous, al-
though the utmost care is exercised to prevent the harm.139
Section 520 defines an ultrahazardous activity as one that "(a)
necessarily involves a risk of serious harm to the person, land
or chattels of others which cannot be eliminated by the exer-
cise of the utmost care, and (b) is not a matter of common us-
age.")140
Although the Restatement criteria derive from Rylands,
most commentators view the ultrahazardous activity test as
both narrower and broader than the test in Rylands-narrower
136. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
137. Cf. Ewell v. Petro Processors of La., Inc., 364 So. 2d 604 (La. Ct. App.
1979) (waste generators found not liable although disposal site operator liable
in negligence for toxic leakage), explained in text accompanying note 80 supra.
138. See Comment, supra note 107, at 105.
139. RESTATEMENT Or ToRTs § 519 (1938).
140. Id. § 520.
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because the test requires extreme danger, and broader because
it ignores the location of the activity.141 The classification of ac-
tivities under the Restatement as ultrahazardous is a more
mechanical process than that used under Rylands or the Sec-
ond Restatement. Courts have found strict liability applicable
when the specific enterprise presents unusual and unavoidable
risks.142 Activities traditionally included in this category are
blasting, 4 3 storing of large quantities of dynamite, 44 keeping of
wild animals,14 flying of airplanes,14 6 and crop dusting.14 7 Like
these activities, hazardous waste disposal may result in serious
injury despite precautions. Victims of improper hazardous
waste disposal are usually as helpless to protect themselves
from injuries as are victims of crashing airplanes or exploding
dynamite. Hazardous waste disposal should therefore be con-
sidered an ultrahazardous activity. One major problem under
this theory, however, is that liability is usually not imposed for
an otherwise ultrahazardous activity if the activity involves a
public duty or is done by a common carrier. 4 8 Thus, transport-
ers have historically been exempted from liability under an ul-
trahazardous activity analysis.149
3. Second Restatement of Torts Sections 519 and 520
The Second Restatement substitutes an "abnormally dan-
gerous activity" test'5 0 for the ultrahazardous activity test of
the original Restatement. The Second Restatement lists six fac-
tors courts should consider in applying the test. Factors (a),
141. See Comment, supra note 107, at 102; W. RODGERS, supra note 6, at 161.
142. Morris, Hazardous Enterprises and Risk Bearing Capacity, 61 YALE
LJ. 1172, 1174 (1952). See also Avins, supra note 107, at 361.
143. See, e.g., Federoff v. Harrison Constr. Co., 362 Pa. 181, 66 A.2d 817 (1949).
144. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520, comment e (1938).
145. See, e.g., Copley v. Wills, 152 S.W. 830 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913) (monkeys).
146. See, e.g., United States v. Kesinger, 190 F.2d 529, 531 (10th Cir. 1951).
147. See, e.g., Chapman Chem. Co. v. Taylor, 222 S.W.2d 820 (1949).
148. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 521 (1938).
149. This exemption has been overturned in a few jurisdictions. See Com-
ment, Common Carriers and Risk Distribution" Absolute Liability for Trans-
porting Hazardous Materials, 67 Ky. L.J. 441, 442-43 (1978-1979).
150. (1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is sub-
ject to liability for harm to the person, land or chattels of another re-
sulting from the activity, although he has exercised the utmost care to
prevent the harm.
(2) This strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the possibility of
which makes the activity abnormally dangerous.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1976). Four state supreme courts
(Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, and Washington) have expressly adopted
this analysis. Comment, supra note 107, at 103-04.
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(b), and (d) are similar to factors in the Restatement, but the
others differ significantly:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land
or chattels of others; (b) likelihood that the harm that results from it
will be great; (c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of rea-
sonable care; (d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of com-
mon usage; (e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is
carried on; and (f) extent to which its value to the community is out-
weighed by its dangerous attributes.
1 5 1
The Second Restatement imposes strict liability for a broader
range of activities than does the original Restatement: the Re-
statement would find defendants liable for activities that create
a risk of harm that even utmost care fails to eliminate; the Sec-
ond Restatement would impose liability for a risk of harm that
reasonable care fails to eliminate. Another difference between
the two views is that the Second Restatement includes a bal-
ancing test similar to that used in nuisance theory. 52 In most
hazardous waste cases this test will favor the defendant waste-
generator, because termination of the activity will adversely af-
fect jobs, taxes, and products. 53
The storage, and sometimes the disposal, of large amounts
of toxic wastes is an abnormal use of land within the scope of
the Second Restatement. The storage and disposal of hazard-
ous wastes present a) a high degree of risk of harm to the per-
son, land, and chattels of others; b) a likelihood that the
resulting harm will be great; c) an inability to eliminate risk by
reasonable care; and d) an uncommon use of land.154 Disposal
of hazardous wastes may not in all cases, however, meet the re-
maining two Second Restatement criteria: e) inappropriateness
to the place where the activity is carried on, and f) more danger
than benefit. The dangers from these hazardous wastes may be
considered less important than the economic benefits provided
by the industries. Even these last two criteria, however, will be
met in many cases.1 55 The inappropriateness criterion presents
considerations similar to those posed by the "nonnatural" use
151. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1976).
152. Comment, supra note 107, at 102-03.
153. See Comment, supra note 107, at 103. In some instances, however, even
when the defendant's activity benefits a community the risk of harm to the
community inherent in the activity will outweigh the benefit and plaintiff will
prevail. See Yommer v. McKenzie, 255 Md. 220, 226, 257 A.2d 138, 141 (1969).
154. See notes 3-5 supra.
155. A poorly located disposal site can be quite costly. For example, the
water supplies in fifteen towns in Massachusetts were contaminated by leakage
from hazardous waste disposal sites into the groundwater. The estimated cost
of purification is $25 million. The problem is further complicated because the
state has 4500 industries which produce toxic wastes, but not enough facilities
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criterion of Rylands.156 Presumably, in cases in which a use
would be considered nonnatural under a Rylands analysis, the
use would also be considered inappropriate under an abnormal
use analysis. The criterion of greater danger than benefit will
often be satisfied by a showing of the serious and widespread
consequences of improper disposal of hazardous wastes. 5 7
4. Traditional Defenses to Strict Liability
Strict liability is not absolute liability. Even if hazardous
waste victims can establish the elements necessary under one
of these three forms of strict liability, they may be denied re-
covery because of one or more defenses, including contributory
negligence, assumption of risk, plaintiff's unusual sensitivity,
the defendant's public duty, and intervening acts of third per-
sons, animals, or God.158 Use of these defenses varies among
jurisdictions. Under the original Restatement, the defendant's
public duty to perform an ultrahazardous activity and the
plaintiff's assumption of risk bar recovery in strict liability, but
the plaintiff's contributory negligence and the intervening acts
of third parties, animals, or God do not.159 Under the Second
Restatement, strict liability is barred by the defendant's public
duty to perform abnormally dangerous activity, the plaintiff's
assumption of risk, unusual sensitivity, or intentional trespass
onto defendant's land, or by acts of God. Recovery in strict lia-
bility is not barred, however, by the plaintiff's contributory neg-
ligence or the intervening acts of third parties. 60
The most complete and common bar to strict liability is the
plaintiff's assumption of risk.161 This defense requires a show-
ing that the plaintiff fully knew of and appreciated the risk, and
to handle all the wastes even if industry officials tried to dispose of it properly.
10 ENvRm. REP. (BNA) 1358 (1979).
156. See notes 116-123 supra and accompanying text.
157. See notes 3-5 supra.
158. See Comment, supra note 107, at 105. See also Chicago & N.W. Ry. v.
Tyler, 482 F.2d 1007, 1009-11 (8th Cir. 1973); Wheatland Irrigation Dist. v. Mc-
Guire, 537 P.2d 1128, 1131-43 (1975); see generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 521-524A (1976); Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory
Negligence, and Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L REv. 93 (1972); Westra, Re-
structuring the Defenses to Strict Products Liability-An Alternative to Com-
parative Negligence, 19 SANTA CiARA L. REV. 355 (1979).
159. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 521-524 (1938).
160. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 521-524A (1976).
161. See Noel, supra note 158, at 119; Westra, supra note 158, at 368. The
most recent trend in jurisdictions recognizing comparative fault has been to
treat comparative negligence, implied assumption of risk, and misuse of prod-
uct as defenses to strict liability as well as to negligence actions. Whether the
plaintiff's conduct bars or merely reduces recovery is a question of fact for the
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acted voluntarily. In some jurisdictions this defense bars re-
covery even for the defendant's violation of statute. 162 Never-
theless, this defense will clearly not bar recovery for many
victims of hazardous waste disposal. Some of the residents of
the Love Canal area, for instance, knew their land had once
been a dump site, but had no appreciation of the risks in-
volved.163 In other situations hazardous waste victims possess
no knowledge of the hazard, since the EPA itself has no com-
prehensive listing of disposal sites.164
The theories expressed in Rylands, the original Restate-
ment, and the Second Restatement offer compensation to many
hazardous waste victims. The federal statutes that demon-
strate a legislative judgment concerning the proper treatment
of hazardous wastes165 can aid in determining what is a non-
natural, ultrahazardous, or abnormal use. Extension of tradi-
tional theories, even if aided by the federal statutes, will not
reach all injured victims who desire compensation. A court's
consideration of both the dangerous nature and the location of
defendant's activities can still bar compensation for a large
class of hazardous waste victims. Thus, a broader theory is
necessary to ensure compensation for all innocent victims of
improper disposal.
B. PRODUCTS LiABmrrY THEORY BASED ON SECTION 402A OF
THE SECOND RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
Strict liability under section 402A of the Second Restate-
ment of Torts is premised on an enterprise rationale: 6 6 "losses
historically recognized as compensable when caused by an en-
terprise, or activity... ought to be borne by those persons who
have some logical relationship with that enterprise or activ-
ity.' 67 Inherent in this rationale is an attempt to make the
jury. Phillips, A Synopsis of the Developing Law of Products Liability, 28
DRAKE L. RaV. 317, 370 (1978-79).
162. See Noel, supra note 158, at 119.
163. See Brown, supra note 4, at 35.
164. See HAzARDous WASTE DisposAL, supra note 2, at 2.
165. See notes 11-39 supra and accompanying text.
166. A few commentators have discussed the imposition of strict liability as
a deterrent to pollution and as a method of compensating pollution victims.
See, e.g., Esposito, Air and Water Pollution" What to do While Waiting for
Washington, 5 HAav. C.R-C.L. L. REv. 32, 38 (1970); Michelman, Pollution as a
Tort: A Non-Accidental Perspective on Calabresi's Costs, 80 YALE I.J. 647, 666-
83 (1971).
167. Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 47 U. CoLO. L. REV.
153, 158 (1976). Klemme views enterprise liability as the dominant theory of
tort liability today and as the most helpful tool in explaining changes in tort
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price of a product reflect its "true" costs. 168
In addition to determining whether the enterprise did in
fact cause the victim's injury, courts often analyze three fac-
tors: whether the enterprise failed to meet normal expecta-
tions of safe operation, whether one party is better able to
prevent future injuries, and whether one party is better able to
spread the cost of either prevention or insurance.169 Products
liability170 judgments imposing strict liability are the most com-
mon application of the enterprise rationale. In a products lia-
bility suit, the plaintiff must establish that the product was
defective and unreasonably dangerous and that it caused the
plaintiff's injury.171
law. Id. at 175. See also Bridgeman-Russell Co. v. City of Duluth, 158 Minn. 509,
511, 197 N.W. 971, 972 (1924).
168. See Klemme, supra note 167, at 159-60. Losses caused by products are
often shifted either by the producer through raised prices reflecting self-insur-
ance or purchased insurance, or by the victim through medical and property in-
surance. See Morris, supra note 142, at 1176-78.
169. See Klemme, supra note 167, at 179.
170. Prosser defines products liability as the "name currently given to the
area of case law involving the liability of sellers of chattels to third persons
with whom they are not in privity of contract." W. PROSSER, supra note 54, § 96,
at 641 (footnotes omitted). Most cases are based upon negligence or strict lia-
bility. Id. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) sets forth the criteria
for strict products liability:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Con-
sumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to lia-
bility for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or con-
sumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in- which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or en-
tered into any contractual relation with the seller.
Id. For an overview of recent developments in products liability law, see
Pawlak & Moore, The Role of the Federal Court in the Expansion of the Ambit of
Liability of Manufacturers: Conceptual Approaches and a Suggested Solution,
28 DRAKE L. REV. 389 (1978-1979); Phillips, supra note 161; Twersld & Weinstein,
A Critique of the Uniform Product Liability Lau--A Rush to Judgment, 28
DRAKE L. REv. 221 (1978-1979).
171. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965), quoted at note 170
supra. Very few pollution suits have been based on a products liability ration-
ale. The plaintiffs in one such case, City of Chicago v. General Motors Corp.,
467 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1972), unsuccessfully argued that their automobiles were
defective and unreasonably dangerous because of the high level of air pollutant
emissions. The court dismissed the suit by holding that the establishment of
emission standards was a matter for Congress and that individually the cars
were not defective. Id. at 1268-69. Neither of these rationales apply inthe haz-
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Several problems concerning the applicability of section
402A to the hazardous waste context are immediatels' evident
from the title of the section, "Special Liability of Seller of Prod-
uct for Physical Harm to User or Consumer."7 2 Actions for
products liability have traditionally been restricted to cases in-
volving the sale of a product. Thus, transporters and independ-
ent contractors who merely dispose of wastes would not be
strictly liable unless they also sell a product, such as barrels or
other containers, with their services, 7 3 or unless their business
includes sale of products recycled from the wastes. 74
Even if transporters or independent disposers are not held
liable under this theory, it is clear that generator-manufactur-
ers should be liable for their pollution. Although courts would
need to expand their definition of product sale in order to hold
such generators liable, such an interpretation would do no real
violence to the rationale of section 402A. The essential element
of sale is always present in hazardous waste cases because the
generator produces the waste in the process of manufacturing
products for sale. That the sale occurs only when the finished
product is sold makes no difference; the generator still realizes
economic gain from his activities.
A more serious problem with using section 402A lies in its
requirement that the product be the focus of liability. Unless
the wastes are themselves sold as a product, 7 5 the traditionally
required "product" is missing. Policies underlying the recent
ardous waste context, since a court can be guided by the standards Congress
adopted in RCRA and TSCA, and since most hazardous waste accidents are in-
dividually caused by some failure to follow safe procedures.
172. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) (emphasis added).
173. Liability has been imposed on a defendant who was primarily perform-
ing a service but whose service included the sale of a product. Newmark v.
Gimbel's Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969) (holding that the fee charged by
defendant beauty parlor included both the sale of hair lotion and a service).
See also Mallor, Liability Without Fault for Professional Services: Toward a
New Standard of Professional Accountability, 9 SETON HALL L REV. 474 (1978);
Reynolds, Strict Liability for Commercial Services-Will Another Citadel Crum-
ble?, 30 OKLA. L REv. 298 (1977).
174. See note 5 supra (recycling of oil containing PCBs).
175. Wastes are sold when recovered and reprocessed into useable prod-
ucts. A dramatic increase in resource recovery has occurred. Although ten
years ago almost no resource recovery facilities existed in the United States,
thirty such facilities now operate and process eight million tons of solid waste
annually. In addition, sixteen million tons of glass and metal are recovered an-
nually. 10 Enm. REP. (BNA) 1681 (1979) (Rocco Petrone, President of the Na-
tional Center for Resource Recovery). See also Passman, supra note 87, at 396-
97 (suggesting RCRA might aid in determining dangerousness of compost
made from municipal sludge and sold to greenhouses, landscapers, and farm-
ers).
1980]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
federal legislation,176 however, support a broader definition of
"product." Statutes regulating hazardous materials are in-
tended to shift the generator's focus from the finished product
to the entire manufacturing process and thereby to encourage
elimination of as much waste as possible in the design stages.
A similar shift in judicial focus would further that congres-
sional goal. As Congress has explicitly recognized, the finished
product should not be viewed in isolation from the energy used
to produce it or from the wastes it generates.177
Defects in hazardous waste disposal occur in one of three
contexts: 1) the design of the manufacturing and waste dispo-
sal process, 2) the actual operation of the process,s7 8 or 3) the
failure of the manufacturer to warn against improper handling
or monitoring of the wastes.179 If the defect lies either in the
operation of a safely designed disposal procedure or the failure
to warn about dangers in handling, traditional products liability
cases provide clear models. If the defect lies in the design of
the disposal process, however, courts may be reluctant to en-
gage in lengthy and complex investigations of alternative
processes. Criteria from federal statutes like RCRA and TSCA
can aid the court in determining what is an unreasonably dan-
gerous disposal design.180 Although the use of these criteria
might appear to be a retroactive application of law, such use is
merely one method of defining reasonable safety.
One commentator has suggested that the proper test for an
unreasonably unsafe design is whether "a reasonable person
would conclude that the magnitude of the scientifically perceiv-
able danger as it proved to be at the time of trial outweighed
176. See notes 11-39 supra and accompanying text.
177. See Andersen, supra note 12, at 638, 647-48.
178. This defect is analogous to the "unit defect" in a traditional products
liability case: the overall design is sound but a specific unit is flawed due to a
deviation from standard manufacturing procedures.
179. W. PROSSER, supra note 54, § 99 at 659. The intricacies of the debate
over the meaning of "defect" are beyond the scope of this Note. See generally
Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REv. 339 (1974);
Henderson, Renewed Judicial Controversy Over Defective Product Design: To-
ward the Preservation of an Emerging Consensus, 63 Min. L REv. 773 (1979);
Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY's L.J. 30
(1973); Legomsky, Auto Manufacturers and High Speeds: Is a Fast Car a Defec-
tive Product?, 19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 77 (1979); Wade, On the Nature of Strict
Liability for Products, 44 MIss. L.J. 825 (1973); Comment, Torts-Products Lia-
bility-Strict Liability for Defect in Design, 43 Mo. L. REv. 601 (1978).
180. Professor Henderson suggests that courts must either develop their
own standards or adopt some legitimate extrajudicial source. Henderson,
supra note 179, at 774. See generally Phillips, The Standard for Determining
Defectiveness in Products Liability, 46 U. Cir. L. REV. 101, 103-05 (1977). RCRA
provides such extrajudicial criteria. See notes 13-16 supra.
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the benefits of the way the product was so designed and mar-
keted."' 81 The key factor in this test is not the manufacturer's
knowledge at the time of his action, but his subsequent knowl-
edge of the danger and harm resulting. An application of this
test, though not conclusive of unreasonable dangerousness,
would be a significant factor to consider along with other fac-
tors, such as the utility of the product, the cost of its disposal
method, and the infeasibility or additional cost of designing a
safer process.182 Thus, through the use of scientifically derived
statutory criteria, the generators and disposers would be pro-
tected from the automatic and potentially non-uniform applica-
tion of new standards. The plaintiff would still bear the burden
of persuading the factfinder that the costs of the disposal de-
sign, including the accident costs, exceeded the benefits. 83
A less serious problem concerning the applicability of sec-
tion 402A to the hazardous waste context is presented by "the
user or consumer" scope of the section. 84 In jurisdictions that
narrowly interpret that language, many hazardous waste vic-
tims would fail to recover, since many such victims do not liter-
ally use or consume hazardous wastes or associated products.
In many jurisdictions, however, these terms have been inter-
preted quite broadly to permit recovery by mere bystanders.185
This language, therefore, would not seem to bar the application
of section 402A to hazardous wastes.
Strict liability under section 402A is not, however, absolute
liability. The three most significant defenses to a products lia-
bility action are assumption of risk, abnormal use of the prod,
uct, and, in some jurisdictions, the plaintiff's contributory
negligence.18 6 The latter two defenses create special problems
181. Keeton, supra note 179, at 38 (emphasis in original).
182. Id. See Wade, supra note 179 at 837-38 (suggesting several additional
factors to consider in analyzing the reasonable safety of a particular product,
such as the usefulness of the product and the availability of a substitute prod-
uct).
183. Henderson, supra note 179, at 775.
184. In jurisdictions where liability is based on contractual warranties,
rather than on the Second Restatement of Torts § 402A, problems of privity
might prevent application of strict liability, because no sale has taken place be-
tween the victim and the disposer or generator of waste.
185. W. PRossER, supra note 54, at 662-63. See Elmore v. American Motors
Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969) (holding that bystander
could recover in strict liability from the manufacturer of a defective automo-
bile). The drafters of the Second Restatement did not specifically include or ex-
clude bystanders, but did include others who were passively enjoying a
product's benefits. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF TORTS § 402A, caveat and com-
ment 1 (1965).
186. See Noel, supra note 158, at 93-95. See also Phillips, supra note 161, at
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in the hazardous waste context. Generally, a manufacturer is
liable for harm that results from a foreseeable misuse but not
for unforeseeable abnormal use of his product.187 Abnormal
use might arise in various ways in the hazardous waste con-
text. For example, oil contaminated with PCB might, with
proper warnings, be legitimately sold for a limited purpose but
then be used for an unintended purpose. 8  The prior warn-
ings, if adequate, would insulate hazardous waste generators
from liability. A successful contributory negligence defense
would be rare in jurisdictions that adhere closely to the 402A
formulation of strict products liability,189 but would be likely in
jurisdictions that allow comparative negligence.190 In light of
the policies for imposing strict liability, contributory negligence
should not bar the plaintiffs recovery, since fault is not an is-
sue.191 Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court, in a very
controversial decision, has allowed the plaintiff's negligence to
370-72; Comment, Strict Liability in Tort-Risk/Utility Analysis to be Used in
Determining Existence of Design Defect; Contributory Negligence Valid Defense
to Strict Liability Claim Only Under Narrow "Assumption of Risk" Definition,
9 SETON HALL L. REV. 888 (1978).
187. Legomsky, supra note 179, at 82-83.
188. If the farmer who used recycled oil to soak rubbing pads for his cattle,
see note 5 supra, had been adequately warned not to use the oil on livestock
but then did so anyway, the seller would not be liable for the farmer's misuse
of the product.
189. Noel, supra note 158, at 106 (citing Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d
418, 425-27, 261 N.E.2d 305, 308-09 (1970)).
190. Courts, legislatures, and commentators are divided over the question
whether comparative fault should be allowed as a defense in strict liability
suits. Recent Minnesota Cases, 62 MwN. L. REv. 1209, 1325 (1978). The Minne-
sota Supreme Court in Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn.
1977), held that a plaintiff's ordinary contributory negligence is a defense to a
strict products liability suit and may be compared with the product manufac-
turer's strict liability under Minnesota's comparative fault statute, MmN. STAT.
§ 604.01(1) (1976) (amended 1978).
One explanation for the split in authority concerning the appropriateness
of the comparative negligence defense in strict products liability cases is that
the jurisdictions differ in their views of the primary purpose of strict liability.
Jurisdictions allowing a comparative negligence defense view strict liability as
a form of negligence per'se or hidden fault, but jurisdictions denying such a de-
fense view strict liability as a means of distributing risks and imposing costs of
harm on the party that introduces a defective product into the marketplace. Re-
cent Minnesota Cases, supra, at 1326-27.
191. This is essentially the position taken in comment n of the Second Re-
statement of Torts § 402A.
Strict liability based on enterprise theory has also been attacked on consti-
tutional grounds with little success. Typically, these arguments focus on the
fifth amendment right to due process and the fourteenth amendment right to
equal protection. See, e.g., Neely & Hines, The Unconstitutionality of the Doc-
trine of Strict Liability, 46 INS. COUNSEL J. 289 (1979).
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reduce recovery under comparative negligence principles.192
The policies of strict products liability strongly support ex-
tending strict liability to hazardous waste cases. In his concur-
ring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,193 Justice
Traynor set forth several of these policies: 1) to force even non-
negligent manufacturers to take steps to prevent future harm;
2) to spread the costs of injury-costs that might overwhelm an
individual-to the manufacturers who can insure against the
risk or pass the higher costs on to their customers; 3) to fix re-
sponsibility on the party who introduced the risk into the mar-
ketplace and who is thus most likely to have evidence to refute
negligence charges and evaluate the product's safety; and 4) to
place responsibility on those who induce reliance on their repu-
tations. 194 Despite the lack of privity between the manufac-
turer and the victim in Escola, Traynor concluded that these
policies justified the imposition of strict liability. The manufac-
turer, Traynor asserted, is responsible for any injury its defec-
tive product caused to "any person who comes in lawful contact
with it."195
Three of Traynor's four policies directly apply to the haz-
ardous waste context. First, strict liability would encourage
generators and disposers to prevent harm resulting from even
nonnegligent acts. Although courts would use the federal stat-
utes such as RCRA as a starting point in considerations of lia-
bility, and thereby benefit from the availability of legislative
standards, courts would not be rigidly bound by those criteria.
In extreme cases the imposition of strict liability could be used
to force generators and disposers to go beyond statutory min-
ima to ensure that the disposal methods were not unreasonably
dangerous.
Imposition of strict liability would further Traynor's second
policy: cost spreading. Individual homeowner's insurance usu-
ally does not cover property damage from seepage or spillage of
192. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 737-39, 575 P.2d 1162, 1169-
70, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 387-88 (1978). This case has been sharply criticized for
confusing liability based on negligence and strict liability. See, e.g., Westra,
supra note 158, at 355, 377-78. See also Recent Minnesota Cases, supra note 190,
at 1327.
193. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944). The Minnesota Supreme Court
echoed Traynor's rationale in another exploding bottle case. See Lee v. Crook-
ston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 290 Minn. 321, 328-29, 188 N.W.2d 426, 432 (1971).
194. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461-68, 150 P.2d 436, 440-44 (1944) (concurring opinion).
These policies have been analyzed by various commentators. See generally
Fischer, supra note 179; Keeton, supra note 179; Wade, supra note 179.
195. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 440
(1944) (concurring opinion).
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chemical wastes. The generator, however, can either insure
against this liability or recover the costs of preventing such in-
juries by passing the costs on to consumers in the form of
higher prices for its products. Since consumers benefit from
having such products available, it is more equitable that they,
rather than innocent hazardous waste victims, bear the full
costs associated with the products.
Justice Traynor's third policy, alleviation of proof problems
for plaintiffs, also applies to the hazardous waste context. The
Ewell case' 96 demonstrates the difficulty of proving the defend-
ant's knowledge of unreasonable risk. Although the intricacies
of the manufacturing and disposal processes are well known to
the generator and, in some cases, the disposer, only with diffi-
culty can the plaintiff-victim ascertain those intricacies. The
victim often must pay for costly and sophisticated tests simply
to determine what chemical has caused his injury. The victim
may have further difficulty tracing that chemical to a particular
manufacturer if the chemical was disposed of in an indepen-
dently operated site. The threat of a strict liability lawsuit
would encourage both the manufacturer and the generator of
hazardous wastes to keep better records of the chemicals gen-
erated and the methods and places of disposal. The plaintiff
would benefit from these comprehensive records that may pro-
vide proof of the generator's or disposer's knowledge of an un-
reasonable risk.
Justice Traynor's fourth policy, placing responsibility on
those who induce reliance on their reputation, is less relevant
in the hazardous waste context but clearly has some applica-
tion. Courts have allowed bystanders to recover although they
have not relied personally on the manufacturer's reputation.197
Traynor's reliance policy is a more generalized concept than
that of warranty or misrepresentation. There may be some
question whether a generator-manufacturer makes any mean-
ingful representation about the way it handles its products'
wastes, but the essential element of a commercial transaction,
as in traditional warranty cases, is still present. Although the
community benefits from the taxes paid and the salaries gener-
ated by the manufacturer, the community also relies on the
manufacturer to conduct itself in a safe manner and does not
196. 364 So. 2d 604 (La. Ct. App. 1978). See notes 79-85 supra and accompa-
nying text.
197. See W. PROSSER, supra note 54, § 100, at 662-63.
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normally anticipate and provide for the costs of unsafe manu-
facturing practices.
A cause of action for hazardous waste victims based on sec-
tion 402A is well suited to the policies set forth by Justice Tray-
nor. To effectuate these policies, however, courts must be
willing to expand their concepts of product and sale. Genera-
tors of hazardous wastes will not be absolutely liable, since the
plaintiff must establish that the disposal practices were both
defective and unreasonably dangerous. In addition, traditional
strict liability defenses remain. Even under section 402A some
gaps in compensation will remain in jurisdictions where the in-
dependent disposer is not held liable because he merely pro-
vided a service, because the victim is a bystander, or because a
transporter is the responsible party.
V. CONCLUSION
Victims of improper disposal of hazardous wastes are grow-
ing in number as more wastes are generated and as the in-
creased costs of proper disposal create economic pressures
clandestinely and illegally to dispose of hazardous wastes.
Traditional tort remedies, plagued by problems of proof, are in-
effective tools for compensating hazardous waste victims.
Strict liability offers the only viable method of providing com-
mon law compensation to victims.
To maximize their chance of success, victims must base
their claims on a combination of strict liability theories. Al-
though a theory based on Rylands presents the closest parallel
to some hazardous waste cases, this theory may be unavailable
to victims injured in industrial areas. A theory based on the
original Restatement of Torts offers victims compensation only
in those jurisdictions willing to identify hazardous waste dispo-
sal as an ultrahazardous activity. Some jurisdictions may be
more willing to classify hazardous waste disposal as an abnor-
mal use of land under the Second Restatement of Torts than as
an ultrahazardous activity under the original Restatement, but
the Second Restatement theory raises a further hurdle by in-
cluding a nuisance-like consideration of the activity's value to
the community. Liability based on section 402A of the Second
Restatement requires the most significant departure from tradi-
tional theory, but offers hazardous waste victims the greatest
potential for full compensation. If courts are willing to broaden
the definitions of product and sale, victims will be able to seek
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compensation from a chain of potential defendants who are in
some way responsible for the victims' injuries.
Recently enacted federal statutes will aid courts in deter-
mining whether strict liability should be applied. Although
generators and disposers will argue against retroactive applica-
tion of these statutory standards, their application can ease the
plaintiff's burden of proof and provide the court with a well-
considered guide. As one Eighth Circuit judge has commented,
"[tihe common law is not sterile or rigid and serves the best
interests of society by adapting standards of conduct and re-
sponsibility that fairly meet the emerging and developing
needs of our time."' 98 In order to shift the full costs of activi-
ties generating hazardous wastes to those who profit or benefit
from them, strict liability should be imposed on the generators,
disposers, and transporters of hazardous wastes.
198. Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 506 (8th Cir. 1968) (Gib-
son, C.J.).
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